The Contract of the Corporate Surety by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 3 Article 8 
1936 
The Contract of the Corporate Surety 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Contract of the Corporate Surety, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 473 (1936). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol5/iss3/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COMMENTS
be extracted. The first point of emphasis is to note dearly and decisively that,
in America at least, the inherent rights of control and custody of children are
firmly fixed in the home, and in the natural parents. In the absence of ab-
normal circumstances within the domestic circle the State has only a limited
right to intervene in matters pertaining to the child's moral, educational,
physical and religious upbringing. When complications intervene and the
breakdown of the home is involved, the approach by the State to this regret-
table situation is with the objective of protecting the best interests of the
child. The salvaging of human values is essentially a matter of compromise
with the eye of the court directed to the welfare of the unfortunate children.
No magic formula exists. Institutional care,114 and paternalism of the State
may be imperative in these emergencies but no law or statute can completely
rectify the irreparable harm and work a satisfactory solution. Perhaps the
parting proposal might be that the cure is not to be found in the law but in
a removal of the social and economic shortcomings which have made the
children the innocent victims of their elders' folly.
T=n CONTRACT OF THE CORPORATE SURETY.'-NOt until the last quarter
of the nineteenth century did corporate enterprise in this country grasp the
potentialities inherent in the practise of "going bond."2 One of the oldest of
114. There is a definite trend to place a dependent child in a foster home rather than
in an institution. This is because institutional life is necessarily surrounded with artificial
atmosphere which is inferior to the natural contacts which home life provides. Wmzn Housz
Cor x .aNc oN Cams HFATH AND PROTECMION. Sr.cO. IV (1930) 134; HALL, So z,
WoRK Yr~kR Boon (1935) 164; MANGOLD, PROBLMS OF Cmw Wsr~ Ar (1930) 499. "Insti-
tutional care for the most part has produced uninspired individuals poorly adjusted for the
outside world." W3rrn HousE CONFERENCE ON CmD HEALTH Alm Pnorwrio.'. Sacno:; IV
(1930) 134.
1. Bifold in meaning, the term "suretyship" is more generally employed in its broad
senso by the courts to include all promises to answer for the debt of another regardless
of the form of the undertaking. Bouvtm, LAw Dicnoxanx (Student's ed. 1928) 1152;
AAwr, SuRrsn, (1931) § 5. Because the law applicable to the term is usually the
same when the term is used either in respect to primary obligations, which are also known
as those of strict suretyship, or to those collateral or accessorial in nature, more often
called guaranties, courts have little reason to be hyper-techaical in the choice of these
words. Ibid. 2 WnroN, CoNmRACTS (1920) § 1211. Where, however, distinction is
thought necessary for clarity, courts do not hesitate to use the terms "guaranty" and
"suretyship" in their restricted sense. Pfaelzer v. Kau, 207 EL. 116, 69 N. E. 914 (1904);
Young v. Merle & Heaney Mfg. Co., 184 Ind. 403, 110 N. E. 669 (1915); Clymer v.
Terry, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 300, 109 S. W. 1129 (1908); Ricketson v. Lizotte, 90 VL 386,
98 At 801 (1916).
2. According to Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship (1927) 12 Coaer.
L. Q. 153, 487, the first company to be chartered in America was the Fidelity Insurance
Co. in 1865. 34 BANKERs' MAGAZINE 423, fixes the organization of the first corporate
surety in 1866, while according to Arnold, The Compensated Surety (1926) 26 Cot.. L. RzT.
171, the first incorporation of this type of business did not occur until 1875 although
attempts to organize were begun as early as 1853 in this country and 1720 in England.
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legal relationships,3 suretyship had accumulated a body of long established
rules and principles a majority of which remain substantially impregnable
to this day. But with the entry of corporate organization into the field a
marked deviation from the well-grooved path over which this branch of the
law had theretofore progressed became increasingly apparent.4 Whether the
decisions form the basis of a trend wholly irreconcilable with past develop-
ments or merely represent the adaptability of legal principles to the exigen-
cies of social growth is debatable. Certain it is, however, that principles have
been established, applicable only to the corporate surety, which a half cen-
tury ago "would have startled the legal profession." 5
It is unfortunate that the theory underlying so important a change in the
law has been only imperfectly expressed by the courts. But to impute its
development to the vagaries of the judicial process while perhaps conducive to
brevity is not conducive to clarity. One fact' cannot be disputed: the self-
protective and precise method of the corporate surety is rapidly displacing the
informal procedure characteristic of the individual or accommodation surety.0
This circumstance at once suggests a possible basis for the changes alleged
to have occurred.
The Doctrine of Strictissimi Juris
The function of the individual surety was that of an accommodation party.
In the eyes of the law, if not always in fact, he received nothing for his
undertaking which was presumably based on friendship or family tie.1 He
made little effort to protect his interests. 'He did not prepare the con-
3. Morgan, supra note 2, at 153, gives evidences of this type of contract circa 2750
B. C. A discussion of the change wrought in the law of suretyship since the time of
ancient Rome will be found in Loyd, The Surety (1917) 66 U. or PA. L. Ray. 40.
4. In Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit Guaranty Co., 73 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) It
was said that contracts of guaranty against loss by sales on credit were not to be con-
strued in favor of the surety, citing for the proposition two cases involving insurance
law: Wallace v. German-American Ins. Co., 41 Fed. 742 (C. C. Iowa 1882) (fire Insur-
ance) and Wadsworth v. Jewelers' & Tradesmen's Co., 132 N. Y. 540, 29 N. E. 1104
(1892) (life insurance). Since that time the rule of strictissimi juris has been applied
almost solely to the individual surety.
S. Tackett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 112 Kan. 500, 512, 212 Pac. 357,
362 (1923).
6. Because of the nature of the corporate surety's business which holds itself out pub-
licly to those in need of its services the idea quickly took root and the surety company
has to a large measure almost wholly displaced the individual surety. Many of the exist-
ing companies were established between 1880 and 1900. About 25 of these organizations
conduct the national surety and fidelity business. In addition there are a number of
local companies. Arnold, loc. cit. supra note 2. The spurt in the general corporate growth
occurred approximately during the same period. PArrmsON, TnE WoRm's EcoNoxic
D E MA (1930) 72, 286.
7. The courts presume that the contract of the individual surety is gratuitous and
motivated by friendship. Loyd, supra note 3, at 65. See also the quotation cted note
13, infra. But it has been said that the rule of strictissimi juris would not be applied to
the individual surety where he receives "a premium paid or other consideration." In re
Oeflein's Estate, 209 Wis. 386, 394, 245 N. W. 109, 112 (1932).
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tract; often he did not even read it; rarely did he understand its full scope
and legal significance.8 Under these circumstances the courts felt constrained
to apply the doctrine of strictissimi juris,9 entitling the surety to invoke the
most tenuous technicalities in order to secure release from the obligations of
his contract.0 o It is to be noted, however, that while some courts applied
the doctrine of strictissimi juris to all contracts of suretyship," substantial
authority developed the view that where the words used were explicit and
free from ambiguity, the rules of construction applicable to a simple contract
should prevail in determining the intention of the parties without any pre-
conception in favor of the suretyYi s Only where that intent was not ascer-
tainable from the fair import of the words employed was resort to be had to
the doctrine of strictissimi juris in order to enable the surety to assert his
right to have all doubtful expressions of intent resolved in his favor. 3  Not-
8. STrxAs, SumxRsH (3d ed. 1922) § 234 suggests that if the individual surety
undertook to fortify himself with the same care evinced by the corporate surety the
resulting liability of both would be the same. Cf. Hargreave v. Siee, 6 Bing. 224, 130
Eng. Reprints 1274 (C. P. 1829); Belloni v. Freeborn, 63 N. Y. 3S3 (1875).
9. "A surety is everywhere in law a favored debtor. He is moreover a necessity in
many of the most important business transactions of life, both public and private, and
the policy of the law is that he should be favored more than any other debtors, since he
is or may be to a certain extent, powerless to protect himself." State v. Churchill, 48 Ark.
426, 442, 3 S. W. 352, 359 (1887).
10. So broad has been the application of this doctrine that unless the contract with
the individual surety is performed literally, he is released from further liability. This.
is true even though the noncompliance redounds to the surety's benefit. Bangs v. Strong,
7 Hill 250 (N. Y. 1843); see Grant v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 93, 97 (1871). It has been held
that a mere executory agreement to change the precise nature of the obligation rather
than actual performance of the proposed change will release the surety. O'Neal v. Kelley,
65 Ark. 550, 47 S. W. 409 (1898). The general rule has been applied with utmost strict-
ness in cases involving building contracts. United States v. Freel, 92 Fed. 299 (C. C. N.
Y. 1899); Woodruff v. Shultz, 155 Mich. 11, 118 N. W. 579 (1903); Note (1910) 1&
ANNr. CAs. 347.
11. Nicholson v. Paget, 1 Cromp. & Mees. 48, 149 Eng. Reprints 309 (Ex. 1832);
see 1 BRArm, THE LAW oF SuRLTrrsup AND GuAx rY (3d ed. 1905) § 103.
12. Asp, sT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 39. No exceptional meaning may be placed upon
the words in order to invoke strictissimi juris. Bell v. Bruen, 42 U. S. 169 (1843); Los
Angeles v. Hoppenyan's, Inc., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 138, 47 P. (2d) 293 (1935) (implication
imposing burden not clearly inferable from the language is not to be indulged in); People
v. Southern Surety Co., 76 Colo. 141, 230 Pac. 397 (1924) (where only one reasonable
interpretation there is nothing to be construed); Lewis v. Dwight, 10 Conn. 95 (1834)
(strained construction not permissible); Gates v. McKee, 13 N. Y. 232 (1855) (techni-
cal interpretation not permitted to defeat the intent of the patties); see Srm:cmn, Tim
GENERL LAW OF SuRamns (2d ed. 1913) § 90.
13. The doctrine of strictissimi juris is a rule of application and not one of construc-
tion, e.g., its operation is withheld until the terms of the contract have been ascertained.
Covey v. Schiesswohl, 50 Colo. 68, 114 Pac. 292 (1911); Shaver v. KappelLas, 83 Ind-
App. 338, 146 N. E. 858 (1925); Richardson v. Steuben County, 226 N. Y. 13, 122 N.
E. 449 (1919).
"This rule was sometimes justified upon the ground that their contract is a favor t&
the parties in the sense that it is founded upon a consideration moving not to them-
selves, but to the principals in the contract for which they become sponsors. Although, in
1936]
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withstanding the rejection by the exponents of the latter view of the rule
that the surety had some preEmptive right to the protection of the law upon
which he could rely even when the purport of his agreement was distinct and
unequivocal, a certain degree of solicitude and concern flavors the attitude
of both schools of thought.
The most casual inspection of the decisions involving corporate sureties
will disclose a judicial approach of an entirely different character. Almost
without exception the contract is said to be construed against the corporate
surety in marked contrast to the treatment afforded the individual surety.14
Closely associated with this disinclination of the courts to accord the corporate
surety the privileges enjoyed by its rapidly disappearing competitor is the
inescapable fact that the corporation is engaging in a business for pecuniary
gain.'0 Conceding that the personal surety was in many instances induced to
act by a monetary consideration, 16 his undertaking arose incidentally rather
many cases, this was a violent deduction from the facts, the rule remained that however
greatly the surety may have profited, as he did often profit, by the transaction, he
might, by the form of his contract alone, place himself in the cherishing arms of the law."
Southern Real Estate & Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., 184 S. W. 1030, 1033
(Mo. 1916).
14. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Guarantee Co., 68 Fed. 459 (C. C. Tenn.
1895); National Surety Co. v. Lincoln County, 238 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917);
Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 12 F. Supp. 90 (D. C. Mass. 1935); National Surety
Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co., 83 Ind. App. 195, 146 N. E. 415 (1925); Fidelity & De-
posit Co. v. John Gill & Sons Co., 270 S. W. 700 (Mo. 1924); Bryant v. American Bond-
ing Co., 77 Ohio St. 90, 82 N. E. 960 (1907); Building Contractors' Ltd. Mut. Liability
Ins. Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 185 Wis. 83, 200 N, W. 770 (1924). Contra: Southern
Real Estate & Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., 184 S. W. 1030 (Mo. 1916). See
also STEARNS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 233. But it is interesting to note that in one juris-
diction the doctrine of strictissimi juris is applied alike to the individual and the cor-
porate surety because no plausible ground for any distinction can be found. Lonergan
v. San Antonio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S. W. 1061 (1907).
• 15. It is difficult to determine whether the trend of modem decisions involving the
corporate surety is dependent upon the compensation element or the fact that It is
engaged in a business designed solely for the purpose of "going surety." The importance
of compensation is stressed in National Surety Co. v. Lincoln County, 238 Fed. 705
(C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F. (2d) 678
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926); National Surety Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co., 83 Ind. App. 195,
146 N. E. 415 (1925); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River Union Free High School,
188 Wis. 520, 205 N. W. 926 (1925). But in Bench Canal Draining Dist. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 278 Fed. 67, 80 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) it was said that the "enforcement of
the express terms of the contract of suretyship cannot be made to depend upon whether
the surety is compensated or not. It cannot be one contract when the surety is com-
pensated, and another contract when the surety is not compensated." The Importance
of the business motive is brought out in Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 63 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894); Atlantic Trust & Deposit
Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908); New Haven v. Eastern Paving
Brick Co., 78 Conn. 689, 63 Atl. 517 (1906). But it has been said that "the principles
of law defining the rights of the parties to a suretyship contract must of necessity be the
same, whether the surety is a private person or an incorporated company .... " STEARs,
op. cit. supra note 8, § 233.
16. See the quotation cited note 13, supra. Moreover, some courts have emphasized
[Vol. 5
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than systematically and as part of a business enterprise. Parties were not
solicited; the element of engaging in an organized business was entirely
absent from the transaction. In the face of this vast dissimilarity in purpose
and incentive, it is not surprising that the courts were loathe to accept the
spirit and enforce the letter of the law which had evolved prior to this com-
mercial development. 17  But while a commendable uniformity characterized
the determination of the judiciary to evade the doctrines of the bygone period,
a lesser degree of accord prevailed in discharging the responsibility of estab-
lishing new principles in their stead.'8
The Nature of the Considcration
Considerable attention has been directed to the element of a deliberate and
calculated compensation. 19 The transaction which had theretofore been con-
ducted in a casual and irregular fashion was now enveloped in an atmosphere
of detail, system and efficiency.20 In effect, the corporate surety was holding
itself out to the business world as an agency for the accomplishment of a
needed service.2 ' It was clear that the corporate surety was not submitting
the importance of beneficial consideration moving to the individual surety by declaring
such a transaction to be outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Thus a distinc-
tion in the nature of the consideration was dearly recognized long before the advent
of the corporate surety. See Arnold, The Main Purpose Rule and the Statute of Frauds
(1924) 10 ComR. L. Q. 28.
17. In Arnold, supra note 2, at 172, the author states that it is not surprising that
difficulties were encountered in "grafting" corporation suretyship upon the law pre-
viously applied to the individual surety.
18. See note 15, supra.
19. Many of the decisions which have been rendered against the corporate surety
are founded either solely or in part upon the "premium" factor. Atlantic Trust & De-
posit Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908); Topeka v. Federal Union
Surety Co., 213 Fed. 958 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland Cas-
ualty Co., 8 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Poetker, 180 Ind. 255, 102 N. E. 372 (1913); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. John Gill &
Sons, 270 S. W. 700 (Mo. 1924); State Agriculture & Mechanical Soc. v. Taylor, 104
S. C. 167, 88 S. E. 372 (1916); Building Contractors' Ltd. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. South-
ern Surety Co., 185 Wis. 83, 200 N. W. 770 (1924). This distinction was criticised
in Barton v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 192 Mo. App. 561, 565, 183 S. W. 694, 695
(1916), because it does not distinguish between different classes of sureties who are
in business for a profit.
Contra: Bench Draining Dist. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 278 Fed. 67 (C. C. A. 8th,
1921).
20. Where the details of the contract are not prescribed by la%, as often they are in
judicial and official bonds, the corporate surety usually requires an application in which
both the principal and obligee join in representations which are made conditions of the
bond. Moreover provisions against concealment affecting the risk are generally required
of the obligee in addition to other precautions which are taken. Sram¢s, loc. ci. supra
note 8.
21. It has been said that there are as many as 500 different types of bonds which
have been designed by the corporate surety, more than 300 of which are in common use
today. One author classifies them as follows: (1) fidelity bonds which were first written
in 1865, (2) bonds for executors, administrators and other fiduciaries first used about
1936]
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to the dictates of friendly courtesy or family conscience but was catering to a
definite demand created by the growing complexity of our economic and gov-
ernmental pattern.2 2 These facts inevitably exerted an influence upon the
nature of the consideration.2 3  While the ostensible consideration moving to the
surety is the payment of a stipulated premium, similar to the periodic pay-
ments which support a contract of insurance, the analogy is by no means
perfect. A default in payment in the latter case creates a failure of considera-
tion and justifies cancellation. 24  It has been suggested, however, that in sure-
tyship, when the premium is payable by the principal, his default does not, in
the absence of statute, relieve the surety of liability to the obligee.25 This
holding attributes to the obligee's reliance upon the existence of the bond a
legal significance akin to that of consideration.20 However, such a hypothesis
1879, (3) bonds in court proceedings in use by 1881, (4) contract bonds first employed
in 1887, (5) license and permit bonds in 1890, and (6) public official bonds which were
first permitted by federal law in 1894. The states rapidly followed the federal practice in
opening this last field to the corporate surety. Morgan, supra note 2, at 492.
22. Not only have the services of the corporate surety become indispensable in modem
business but the use of particular types of undertakings in governmental administration
have become a virtual necessity of public life. Among the many official and judicial bonds
are those "insuring" various public officers against losses of public moneys and against
actions beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and in the latter group are bonds for stay-
ing execution, bonds necessary in procuring provisional remedies, ball bonds, bonds of
guardians, committees and others. The marked advantage of the corporate surety in this,
field is emphasized by the provision frequently encountered in statutes making a corporate
surety the equivalent of two individual sureties. See for example N. Y. Civ. PRAo. Acr.
(1895) § 156.
23. While the nature of the compensation of the corporate surety is almost invariably a
money premium it was not generally true that the consideration for the individual surety's
promise was based solely on friendship or family tie. In the realm of the commercial guaranty
wherein the principal obtained credit upon the "name" of a third party, friendship or
family tie was infrequently an inducing cause. Lee v. Lee, 67 Ala. 406 (1880) (direc-
tors became sureties on guardian's bond for his promise to place funds in their bank);
Judd v. Martin, 97 Ind. 173 (1884) (surety's consideration was chattel mortgage);
Rouss v. Creglow, 103 Iowa 60, 72 N. W. 429 (1897) (defendant was surety on debt aris-
ing from sale of goods to firm of which he was a member); Alter v. Horner, 33 La. Ann.
243 (1881) (defendant guaranteed mortgage for stipulated fee to be derived upon fore-
closure). Because of the presumption that the surety's undertaking was gratuitous
the facts of many of the cases do not disclose the benefits derived by the surety from
his undertaking.
24. The consideration for the insurance contract is generally the premium. 1 Coox=,,
Biuxrs ox IxsuA CNc (2d ed. 1927) 771. And as a rule in the absence of provision,
the payment of the premium in advance is necessary for completion of the contract.
Id. at 683.
25. S ARS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 236. Nelson v. American Surety Co., 77 Minn.
402, 80 N. W. 300 (1899) semble; see In re Thurber's Estate, 162 N. Y. 244, 251, 56 N.
E. 631, 633 (1900). But it is to be noted that in the absence of a stipulated provision in,
the contract, the failure of the insured to pay premiums upon an insurance policy releases
the company from its obligation. 1 Coo=, op cit. supra note 24, at 683.
26. It is suggested in STEARNs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 236, that on the basis of this.
theory the premium might be considered as merely an inducement persuading the surety
to contract, thus relegating the matter of compensation to a subordinate status.
[Vol. $
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obscures the vital fact that in reality the corporate surety assumes its obligation
in consideration for the premium and the premium only. The true purpose
behind the rule takes cognizance of the needs of modern business which, to
an ever increasing extent, must rely upon the bonding industry.2 7
The Contract as One of Isurance
The analogy between the contract of the corporate surety and the ordinary
contract of insurance was first advanced in the federal courts in 1894.- Its
reception was immediate and enthusiastic - 9 and the insurance theory, which
offered a seemingly simple solution to many complex problems,3 0 was "settled"
law four years later.?' The absence of any transition period in the formula-
tion of this theory, such as generally precedes the adoption of a novel doctrine,
is perhaps explained by the fact that the growth of the corporate surety was
greatest at this time.32 Thus the various jurisdictions were compelled to seek
27. This is emphasized by the fact that in general a valid contract of suretyship
cannot without statutory provision be rescinded without the consent of all the parties
interested. Commonwealth v. American Bonding Co., 245 Pa. 535, 91 At. 938 (1914);
Richter v. Leiby's Estate, 101 Wis. 434, 77 N. W. 745 (1898). Furthermore, vhere legis-
lation provides for the release of such contracts, the statutes must be strictly complied
with. Clark v. American Surety Co., 171 Ill. 235, 49 N. E. 481 (1897); Bookhart v.
Younglove, 207 Iowa 800, 218 N. W. 533 (1928); Taylor v. Taylor, 66 W. Va. 238, 66 S.
E. 690 (1910).
28. See Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America v. Fidelity & Casualty Co,
68 Fed. 48, 58 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894). The court there mentioned the profit motive of
the surety and held the contract one of indemnity.
29. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Reifler, 239 U. S. 17 (1915) (held an
indemnity agreement); Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Co., 68
Fed. 459 (C. C. Tenn. 1895) (analogous to insurance); Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit
Guarantee Co., 73 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ("credit insurance" is in all essential par-
ticulars insurance); National Surety Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co, 83 Ind. App. 195, 146 N.
E. 415 (1925) (bond to guarantee performance of building contract); Champion Ice Mfg. &
Cold Storage Co. v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 115 Ky. 863, 75 S. W. 197 (1g03)
(defendant not only an insurer but a surety); Quinn-Shepherdson Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 142 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693 (1919) (fidelity bond); Note
(1921) 12 A. L. R. 382; RicHARDs, Ixsu.L,;cE (4th ed. 1932) § 476; VMc, ..suxcn
(2d ed. 1930) §§ 276, 277. But Sr.urnxs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 235, discerns not even
a fair analogy between the contract of insurance and these suretyship agreements.
30. This doctrine was adapted to suretyship law because it enabled the courts to
reach a result desired when dealing with the corporate surety and because the manner
of operation of both the insurance and the surety companies was so Ormilar in many re-
spects that the analogy seemed quite feasible.
31. See Jackson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 75 Fed. 358, 365 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896).
32. The concentration of corporate suretyship in a relatively few number of companies
is a distinguishing characteristic of the industry in this country. From 183 to 1898,
at least 25 new companies were formed. But before that period had empired the pro-
nounced monopolistic tendencies ever present in the field had reduced the total in opr-
tion by 11. Today about 35 surety companies are engaged in a nation-wide business.
Morgan, supra note 2, at 494. Mfany of the present day sureties were organized between
1880 and 1900. Arnold, loc. cit. supra note 2.
19361
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an immediate ratio decidendi which would dispose of the increasing litiga-
tion accompanying this expansion. 33
It may be conceded that many types of contract executed by the corporate-
surety cannot fairly be regarded as promises to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another.3 4 This is well illustrated by the title guarantee
undertaking in which the legal liability of the surety is almost identical
with that of an insurer. But while the margin of distinction between the
title guaranty undertaking and a policy of insurance is indeed slim, 0 the
analogy is less evident with respect to the usual type of engagement which,
the corporate surety undertakes. The argument that insurance involves a
bipartite agreement while suretyship is tripartite in nature, may or may not
withstand criticism as a conceptualistic refinement. 80 More cogent are the,
several contentions: (1) that insurance is a contract of indemnity rather than
a promise to guarantee conduct of a third party; (2) that, moreover, it is
addressed to an impersonal, involuntary act and not to the choice or deter-
mination of the individual ultimately responsible, and (3) that the policy
need never be based upon an underlying obligation."8
As a practical matter the corporate surety conducts its business along the-
same lines as does the insurance company. The same theory of probabilities.
based on empirical formulae is employed although the preciseness of insurers
has as yet not been attained.39 The surety, like the insurance company, spreads.
the risk among the many principals covered, for it is ultimately by the pre-
miums collected that a fund is established to provide for administrative costs
and probable matured risks.40 The tendency to identify suretyship with in-
33. For a list of the states adhering to this view see Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 382. In,
Texas the compensated surety has, like the private surety, the advantage of the doctrine
of strictissimi juris. Hess & Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney, 110 Tex. 148, 216 S. W.
621 (1919).
34. For a list of the types of undertakings in which the corporate surety engages
see note 21, supra.
35. "The insurance contract, in its general form strikingly analogous to the contract
of suretyship, becomes almost identified with it in the form of guaranty insurance." VANCE,
loc. cit. supra note 29. See SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 12, § 7.
36. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 497, where the author indicates that he observes no.
basic difference between the two types of contract.
37. STEuRS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 236.
38. Arnold, supra note 2, at 178. Since the insurance contract is one of indemnity,
the indemnitee may sue immediately upon the happening of the loss and where a pro-
vision creates immediate liability of the surety company, the contract may be likened
to that of insurance. 1 BANDr, op. cit. supra note 11, § 5.
39. As early as 1840 it was said that the use of experience tables could be applied as
accurately to fidelity insurance as to any of the common subjects of insurance. Morgan,
supra note 2, at 164. That this has proven untrue in respect to credit insurance can be
seen from the statistics given in S.xumA, INsuRAN cE AOAiNST CRnnrr Risxs (1935) at
120. Similarly no semblance of accuracy in prediction for the general fidelity and surety-
ship business could be found in a random survey made of the years 1929 and 1935
where there was an 8.5% difference between the ratio of losses and claims to premiums.
BEST'S INSURANCE RCEn, TS (1930) 1025; id., (1934) at 744.
40. 2 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 24, at 988; 1 id. at 15 et seq.
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surance has been so consistent that today the hybrid terms, "guaranty insur-
ance," "fidelity insurance," "credit insurance" and others of similar import are
words commonly used in describing these undertakings. While the corporate
surety continues to invoke the formality of traditional terminology in an
attempt to govern its contracts by the law of suretyship, judicial realism
.denominates them insurance contracts on the conditions specified in the instru-
ment. 4
It is significant to note that the interpretation of the contract as one of
insurance evades the stringent requirements of the statute of frauds42 thereby
Tendering the surety's oral agreements enforcible though literally they import
a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. However,
the applicability of the statute of frauds has not been presented to the courts
with the same frequency as in the period during which the individual surety
prevailed, by virtue of the fact that the modern surety exercises the meticulous
-care common to all corporate management in embodying its obligations in
-writing.
The Doctrine of Fortius Contra Proferentem
The principle that a contract is to be strictly construed against the party
-who drafts it invades many branches of the law.4 3 As in the application of
-strictissimi juris, such construction is not permissible when the intention of
41. The fact that the agreement is in the form of a bond and not a policy is predicated
-upon long existent custom and not regarded as indicative of the type of undertaking.
Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 80 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896),
.rev'd on other grounds, 173 U. S. 582 (1899); VAcr, loc, ct. supra note 29.
42. 1 Coo=, op. cit. supra note 24, at 552. The confusion as to whether a given
-promise is within the statute of frauds is very largely due to an attempt to Classify solely
as promises of indemnity, promises to "indemnify" for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another. 1 WrtasrOir, CoNTRA Ts (2d ed. 1936) § 482. Cf. Meyer v. Building & Realty
Service Co., Inc., 196 N. E. 250 (Ind. 1935) where it was questioned whether a contract
of a corporate surety came within the purview of a statute invalidating provisions of in-
surance policies which limit the time of filing claims to less than three years It was
ield that such a contract was not intended to be included.
The contract was held to be one of suretyship rather than indemnity in Union
Indemnity Co. v. Vetter, 40 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Mlaine Lumber Co., Ltd.
-v. Maryland Casualty Co., 216 App. Div. 35, 214 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1st Dep't 1926);
Montgomery County v. Ambler-Davis Co., 302 Pa. 333, 153 Atl. 621 (1931).
43. Although the principle is most frequently applied to contracts of insurance it is
recognized in other branches of the law as well. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Reiss, 183 U.
S. 621 (1902) (contract of carrier represented by bill of lading construed against carrier);
Laidlaw v. Marye, 133 Cal. 170, 65 Pac. 391 (1901) (builder's contract to repair);
Delogny's Heirs v. Mercer, 43 La. Ann. 205, 8 So. 903 (1891) (contract of sale). It has
been applied in insurance contracts in McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co, 183 U. S. 25
(1901); Cottingham v. National Mut. Church Ins. Co., 290 IIl. 26, 124 N. E. 822 (1919);
Koshland v. Columbia Ins. Co., 237 Mass. 467, 130 N. E. 41 (1921); Ira S. Bushey
& Sons v. American Ins. Co., 237 N. Y. 24, 142 N. E. 340 (1923); French v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 135 Wis. 259, 115 N. W. 869 (1903). Occasionally it has been invoked
in contracts of the individual surety: Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 224, 130 Eng. Reprints
1274 (C. P. 1829); Rose v. Ramm, 254 Mich. 259, 237 N. W. 60 (1931); Belloni v.
Freeborn, 63 N. Y. 383 (1875).
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the parties is clear. 44  The rule obtains only when it has been determined
that an ambiguity exists, in which event the meaning of the language is con-
cluded most strongly against the party who prepares the instrument .4  It is
submitted that the application of this doctrine offers the most desirable ap-
proach to the construction of suretyship contracts. In those cases where
strictissimi juris embarrasses the judiciary by leading to a result diametrically
opposed to that desired, fortius contra proferentem offers a sound legal theory
directed to the adequate protection of business needs. 40  Moreover, it effec-
tively achieves a continuity of principle and method, and appropriately dis-
poses of a notion that the current judicial attitude towards the corporate
surety is either drastic or unwarranted. It is not at all improbable that the
insurance theory is itself merely an argumentative device for applying this
very same rule, in view of the strictness with which ambiguities in a policy
are construed against the insurer.
Conclusion
Prescinding from the soundness of the various theories which have been
advanced, it is apparent that a definite public policy permeates their appli-
cation. The courts have perceived and accepted the practical necessity which
balances the interests of business against the legalistic and highly technical
rights of the surety, and rejects any narrow interpretation which will lead to
the latter's undue protection.47  Basically, the object of obtaining a bond is
44. The rule may not be used to refine away terms which sufficiently express the
intention of the parties. Guaranty Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 183 U. S.
402 (1902).
45. This doctrine is applicable to the contract of the surety whether compensated
or gratuitous, corporate or individual, as well as to contracts in general. See note 43,
supra. In the field of the corporate surety, similarly, the principle requires that contracts
be interpreted in accordance with the meanings of its terms as used and understood in
a plain and popular sense. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Central Nat. Fire Ins.
Co., 4 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). Guaranty Co. of N. America v. Mechanics' Sav-
ings Bank & Trust Co., 183 U. S. 402 (1902); People v. Southern Surety Co., 76 Colo.
141, 230 Pac. 397 (1924); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Mason, 145 Va. 138, 133
S. E. 793 (1926).
46. With the application of this principle the presumptions that the individual surety
generally acts carelessly and without legal advice are rendered irrelevant. AmAT, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 39; S~rSAs, op. cit. sura note 8, §§ 234, 236. Similarly the prudence
and business judgment of the corporate surety in fixing the limits of its obligations are
subordinated to the simple process of documentary construction.
In Atlantic Trust & Deposit Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908) the
court would not permit the corporate surety to plead the technical faults of the instru-
ments which it had drawn because of the "superior means and facilities" which were
open to it. The presumption in Champion Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. American
Bonding Co., 115 Ky. 863, 75 S. W. 197 (1903) was that the bond in dispute wah
prepared by one of the company's skilled attorneys. But where it was not apparent that
the company drew the contract (the stipulations being directed against the surety) the
company was permitted to stand equally with the obligee on the matter of construction.
Southern Real Estate & Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., 184 S. W. 1030 (Mo. 1916).
47. As a result of this view the corporate surety will not be absolved from liability
because of technical deviations from the contract by the obligee. The general rule Is that
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to preclude against the possibility of loss to the obligee through some act of
the principal. This purpose, inherent in the transaction, is subverted and cir-
cumvented if recognition is to be accorded defenses of the proverbial loophole
character.4 s While the tendency to pierce the veil of technicalities interposed
by the surety concededly entails a drain upon the funds of the corporation,
the extraordinary care used by the surety in defining the extent of its liability
operates at once to establish a limit beyond which the courts cannot go with-
out completely disregarding the intention of the parties. 49
Thae diversity in concept which results from the comparison of the status
of the corporate surety with that of the individual suretyV 0 has been attributed
in part "to a reluctance to admit that the rule of strictissin juris has little
justification in modem law."5' It has been seen that the use of the term
"insurance" should create no magical alteration in the characteristics of the
corporate surety's contract. Equally unsatisfactory is the distinction based
merely upon the factor of compensation. The most comprehensive justifica-
tion appears to lie in the fact that the corporate surety is the creator of the
instrument and as such is bound by the use of ambiguous language. It is
paradoxical that the vigor of public policy underlying the whole subject
should have obscured rather than clarified this logical basis for judicial action,
recognized in the law, applicable to the problem and effective to attain a
result essential to the needs of modem business.
the company must prove injury and it will be relieved only to that extent. Lakeside
Land Co. v. Empire State Surety Co., 105 Minn. 213, 117 N. W. 431 (1903); Brown v.
Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 232 Pa. 337, 81 Atl. 410 (1911); Ohio County v. Clemens,
s5 W. Va. 11, 100 S. E. 680 (1919).
48. To adapt the narrow view applicable to individual sureties to contracts of the
corporate surety would tend to endanger the administration of public and private busi-
ness. Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 80 Fed. 766 (C. C. A.
6th, 1896), rev'd on oter grounds, 173 U. S. 582 (1899). The confidence placed In the
corporate surety, which is less subject to the hazard of insolvency than is the private
surety, is evidenced by the statutes of many states providing that the undertaking of
the corpolate surety shall be equivalent to that of two individuals, e.g., N. Y. Civ. Pwtc.
AcT. (1895) § 156. The corporate surety, moreover, prosecutes criminal defaulters re-
lentlessly nor does it deviate because of sentiment or sympathy. VAxca loc. cit. supra
note 29.
49. In interpreting contracts of the corporate surety the courts have always had an
eye to the intention of the parties regardless of what reasoning was used to support this
view. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 99 1d.
423, 58 Atl. 437 (1904); Board of Education v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
155 Mlo. App. 109, 134 S. W. 18 (1911).
50. Loyd, loc. cit. supra note 3.
51. Id., at 67.
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